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Sociology has long shied away from the problem of populism. This may be due
to suspicion about the concept or uncertainty about how to fit populist cases into
broader comparative matrices. Such caution is warranted: the existing interdisci-
plinary literature has been plagued by conceptual confusion and disagreement. But
given the recent resurgence of populist politics in Latin America and elsewhere, soci-
ology can no longer afford to sidestep such analytical challenges. This article moves
toward a political sociology of populism by identifying past theoretical deficiencies
and proposing a new, practice-based approach that is not beholden to pejorative
common sense understandings. This approach conceptualizes populism as a mode of
political practice—as populist mobilization. Its utility is demonstrated through an
application to mid-twentieth-century Latin American politics. The article concludes
by sketching an agenda for future research on populist mobilization in Latin America
and beyond.
Although the demarcation of [objects of study] is not an end in itself . . . , it is
of prime importance. Before we can pose questions of explanation, we must be
aware of the character of the phenomena we wish to explain. (Smelser 1963:5)
The resurgence of so-called neopopulism across Latin America has breathed new
life into an old analytical problem. Over the past two decades, politicians like Peru’s
Alberto Fujimori, Venezuela’s Hugo Cha´vez, and Bolivia’s Evo Morales have gener-
ated legitimacy and support by mobilizing marginalized social sectors into publicly
visible and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist
rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people. For both scholars and political commenta-
tors, the intuitive point of comparison has been with an earlier generation of populist
leaders—such as Peru’s Vı´ctor Rau´l Haya de la Torre, Brazil’s Getu´lio Vargas, and
Argentina’s Juan Domingo Pero´n—whose charismatic styles have come to define a
romantic stereotype of Latin American political culture. Given the significance and
prevalence of populist politics, it is remarkable that the phenomenon has received
almost no attention from sociology. To remedy this deficiency, this article presents a
new theoretical approach that treats populism as a mode of political practice. This
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approach provides the analytical tools necessary to motivate and underpin a fresh
and productive research program into populist politics.
The question of populism is of critical importance to sociology. For political soci-
ologists, populist cases can provide strategic sites for investigating a range of issues:
the relationship between state and society, the role of political parties in represent-
ing and (re)producing social and political cleavages, the dynamics of leadership and
charisma in political movements, and the role of cultural meanings and practices in
politics and policy making. For comparative-historical sociologists, populist cases can
shed light on important questions of development, state formation, and democrati-
zation. At the same time, as we move beyond mass society stereotypes of populism
as atomistic and disorganized, organizational sociologists should have much to learn
through the study of populist movements and parties. And the dramatic appeals of
populist politicians should be of great interest to sociologists of culture and perfor-
mance. Insofar as sociology fails to come to terms with populism, it will be deficient
in its understanding of what has become a central feature of modern civic and
political life.
The term “neopopulism” made its debut in scholarly debate in the late 1980s and
early 1990s as a way to characterize a new breed of Latin American politicians
who implemented neoliberal policies while continuing to mobilize surprising levels
of popular support.1 The term then gained colloquial currency with the turn to
the left in Latin American electoral politics of the 1990s and 2000s, as figures like
Cha´vez and Morales began formulating rhetoric and pursuing policies reminiscent of
a more “classic” Latin American populism (see Cameron and Hershberg 2010). More
recently, the term has been applied to right-wing politicians in Western Europe and
to a range of political movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics
(Berezin 2009; Betz 1994; Held 1996; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Rydgren 2006;
Taggart 2004; Ucˇenˇ 2007; Weyland 1999). In the past few years, it has even come
into use in depictions of contemporary U.S. politics—whether to characterize right-
wing commentators like Rush Limbaugh, grassroots mobilizing by the Democratic
Party (like that of John Edwards in the 2004 primaries), the persona of Sarah Palin
in the 2008 presidential campaign, or the post-2008 “Tea Party” movement.
But what exactly is populism? It stands alongside nationalism and fascism as no-
toriously difficult to conceptualize.2 The term has been used to describe movements,
regimes, leaders, ideologies, policies, modes of incorporation, and state structures.
As Ernesto Laclau (1977:143) has noted, “few [terms] have been defined with less
precision . . . . We know intuitively to what we are referring when we call a movement
or an ideology populist, but we have the greatest difficulty in translating the intuition
into concepts.”
The fundamental problem is that most academic discussions of populism continue
to rely on folk theories. Everyday usage of the term is overly general, applying to
any person, movement, or regime that makes claims by appealing to ordinary (i.e.,
non-elite) people. Such usage may be appropriate for journalistic purposes, but it is
inadequate for social scientific analysis. For one thing, it lacks precision, as it could
characterize politics in virtually any modern regime in which legitimacy is under-
stood to ascend from “the people” rather than descend by divine or natural right
1Such politicians include Peru’s Alan Garcı´a and Alberto Fujimori, Mexico’s Carlos Salinas de Gortari,
and Argentina’s Carlos Menem.
2On the difficulties of conceptualizing populism, see, for instance, de la Torre (2000: 1–27), Ionescu
and Gellner (1969b:1–3), and Laclau (1977:143).
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(Calhoun 1997:70). For another, it facilitates use of the term as a flexible epithet, to
imply that the accused is corrupt, undemocratic, or cynically opportunistic.3 Finally,
such flexible usage conjures grossly inaccurate explanatory metaphors, implying that
populism is a pathology of political culture that is both contagious and hereditary.
Both liberal and Marxist academic discourses fall back on these common sense
understandings, and so for them “populist” remains a pejorative label. In order to
make headway, it is necessary to move beyond folk theories—with their stark moral
valences—and toward an analytically clearheaded theory of the phenomenon.
Unfortunately, political sociology has not offered much help. Though some of
the most prominent early populism scholars were sociologists, few have engaged
the topic in recent years.4 Most broad studies of political forms fail to incorporate
those cases typically labeled “populist.”5 Indeed, no scholar has yet undertaken a
systematic comparative-historical analysis of major populist cases—Latin American
or otherwise—while there have been many such studies of revolution (Foran 2005;
Goodwin 2001; Skocpol 1979), state formation (Anderson 1974; Gorski 2003; Mann
1993; Tilly 1990), democracy (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), and the wel-
fare state (Esping-Anderson 1990; Hicks 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001).6 The
most significant impediment has probably been a general suspicion of “populism”
as a concept. Such caution is warranted, but it has meant that a whole set of impor-
tant cases has been systematically neglected by political and comparative-historical
sociology.
The challenge for sociology is to impose discipline on the concept without un-
duly undermining its richness. I argue that there is a coherence to be discovered
behind populism, but that identifying it requires viewing the phenomenon from the
perspective of political practice. This suggestion resonates with a broader turn to
social action and practice in the contentious politics literature (McAdam et al. 2001;
Tilly 2008) and in sociology more generally (Bourdieu 1977; Joas 1996; Sewell 1992;
Swidler 1986). For the purposes of this article, it means that—rather than trying
to pin down flexible ideologies, pigeonhole entire regimes or movements as if they
have a consistent essence, or discover the class coalitional core of a given political
form—I focus on actually enacted, spatially and temporally bounded projects of
populist mobilization. Populist mobilization is a political means that can be under-
taken by challengers and incumbents of various stripes in pursuit of a wide range of
social, political, and economic agendas. This implies that populism should no longer
be reified as a movement or regime type, but rather understood as a flexible way
of animating political support. Reconceptualizing populism as populist mobilization
3In the United States, “populism” has sometimes taken on a positive moral valence—as in the use of
the term by the contemporary right. But the problems with this usage remain the same.
4The only exception seems to be the U.S. case, which has received a modest share of attention from
political sociologists (see, e.g., Gerteis 2003, 2007; Redding 1992; Schwartz 1976; Soule 1992). The most
prominent sociologists among the early populism scholars were Gino Germani and Torcuato Di Tella
(see below). Mabel Berezin (2009) and Carlos de la Torre (2000) are among the few sociologists to have
recently engaged the topic at a conceptual level.
5Perhaps the most striking example of this omission is McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s much heralded
Dynamics of Contention (2001). Although it is a wide-ranging treatment of contentious politics, this work
does not include a single populist case among its 15 core examples. Lipset’s Political Man (1960) is a rare
exception.
6Collier and Collier (1991) might be seen as an exception, but this monumental work focuses on the
political incorporation of organized labor, not populism per se. Van Niekerk (1974) deals with multiple
populist cases, but his is more a work of typological schematization than of historical explanation. While a
few edited volumes have set a variety of populist cases side by side, these have mostly left the comparison
to the reader (Conniff 1982b, 1999b; Ionescu and Gellner 1969a; Mackinnon and Petrone 1998).
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resolves old conceptual difficulties while illuminating new avenues for comparative
research.
This article explores the utility of such an approach with specific reference to
Latin America—the world region with which the phenomenon has been most often
associated.7 The first part of the article assesses existing approaches to populism,
identifying theoretical shortcomings and highlighting productive points of departure.
The second part outlines a new theoretical approach to the problem of populism.
The third demonstrates the analytical utility of this approach by applying it to the
“classic” era of Latin American populism. Finally, the article concludes by sketching
an agenda for future research.
EXISTING APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF POPULISM
Over the past 50 years, scholars from various disciplines have disagreed not only
about how best to explain populism’s historical emergence, but more fundamentally
about what it is. Most of what has been written has come not in the form of
theoretical statements or comparative analyses, but as historical studies of individual
populist cases. To the extent that these have been explicit in their definitions of
populism (most have not), such definitions have varied widely. In the end, most
historical studies have used the concept to do little more than label cases according
to common sense understandings. Worse still, most cases end up being treated as
exceptional—creating a false impression of their incomparability. This inhibits both
attempts at systematic comparison and the development of cumulative knowledge.
The resulting body of scholarship is thus highly fragmented, and the few attempts
to theorize populism have come up short.
Nevertheless, despite this fragmentation—and at the risk of imputing more coher-
ence to the literature than it actually enjoys—it is still possible to sketch a rough map
of the scholarly terrain. Let me suggest that there have been three relatively broad
“generations” of scholarly thinking about Latin American populism, subsuming five
distinct theoretical approaches. The theoretical approaches have varied widely in
their motivating questions, their units of analysis, their definitions of the explanan-
dum, and their explanatory frameworks. Still, within each generation it is possible
to identify fundamental similarities, especially in terms of how later scholarship has
responded to previous theories. The first generation consisted of modernization and
Marxist theories—both of which focused on the economic determinants of populist
class coalitions. The second generation was both an ideational and an agentic cor-
rective to these previous structuralist approaches. The third generation situated such
ideational and agentic issues in the context of political structures, focusing on how
the failures of democratic institutions to incorporate citizens have continued to ren-
der populist strategies useful to politicians. I will address each of these generations
in turn.
7There are three reasons for thus circumscribing the project. First, while populism has been noted in
a variety of contexts—from late-nineteenth-century Russia (Walicki 1969) and the United States (Good-
wyn 1976; Hicks 1961; Hofstadter 1969; Schwartz 1976), to mid-twentieth-century Africa (Marx 1994;
Saul 1969), to contemporary Europe (see citations above)—Latin America is the region in which the
phenomenon has been the most widespread. Second, in terms of scholarly and popular discourse, it is
the region with which the term has been most consistently associated—and it is here that the existing
populism literature has largely focused. Third, Latin America is the region with which I have the most
scholarly expertise. It is consistent with the division of labor among regionalists that I should let those
with similar in-depth knowledge of other regions judge for themselves the utility of this approach beyond
the confines of Latin America.
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The first generation of populism scholarship was elaborated in the 1960s and 1970s.
Propelled by currents in modernization theory and structuralist Marxism, scholars of
this generation attempted to understand the social bases of support for classic pop-
ulists like Pero´n and Vargas by focusing on the economic determinants of populist
coalitions. The majority of these early populism scholars drew heavily on moderniza-
tion theory (including “mass society” theories).8 Typically, they attempted to discover
the developmental conditions responsible for producing populist coalitions between
the socially mobilized—yet politically unorganized—“masses” and some elite class
fraction that was in a position to take on a leadership role (Di Tella 1965, 1990:17–
34). Populist parties were understood to be political expressions of such coalitions.
At the same time, a smaller number of first-generation studies were motivated by
trends in structuralist Marxism.9 These studies maintained much of modernization
theory’s explanation for the emergence of populism, though they typically couched
it in different language—often relying on Marx’s concept of “Bonapartism” (drawn
from his Eighteenth Brumaire [1977]).
Perhaps surprisingly, the modernization and Marxist approaches had a great deal
in common. They more or less agreed on the importance of defining populism in
social terms, rooted in relations of production and market conditions. In this, they
saw populism as specific to circumstances of peripheral development in the mid-
twentieth century. While later often derided for having been functionalist, materially
reductionist, or for denying the agency of populist supporters, these theories deserve
renewed attention for a number of reasons. First, their close specification of the
phenomenon was an improvement over broad definitions that were of little analytical
utility. Second, they pointed out that populism is not just a quality of “the masses,”
nor is it reducible to the characteristics of a single personality—but that it exists
in the relationships between leaders and supporters. Third, their emphasis on the
systematic disruptions produced by large-scale social change should not be forgotten,
even as questions of agency and culture are brought to the fore.
At the same time, this structuralist generation had its weaknesses. A first limita-
tion is that it usually focused on just two cases—Argentina and Brazil—and tended
to have a hard time traveling beyond these cases. Second, it tended to take classes
and social groups for granted, assuming group formation to be an unproblematic
process. This assumption foreclosed the possibility that populist mobilization might
itself play a role in constituting the social bases of support on which it relies. Third,
this generation leapt directly from social conditions to political outcomes, assuming
an unproblematic translation from one to the other. The important roles of con-
sciousness, organization, and mobilization in producing these outcomes were hardly
discussed. This leap also reinforced a simplistic view of “the masses” as a pool of
easily manipulated individuals and contributed to an impression of politics as epiphe-
nomenal of social dynamics. Finally, both modernization and Marxist approaches
tended to identify populism as limited to a particular developmental stage. This co-
incided with a functionalism that saw populism as an aberration—as a breakdown
in the organic workings of society at a critical moment.
8Classic statements of modernization and mass society theory include Deutsch (1954, 1963), Kornhauser
(1959), and Lipset (1960). For examples of the modernization vein of the populism literature, see Di Tella
(1965), Germani (1963, 1978), Hennessy (1969), Ionescu and Gellner (1969a), Skidmore (1979), and van
Niekerk (1974).
9For examples of this vein of scholarship, see Grompone (1998), Klare´n (1973), Quijano (1968), Spalding
(1977), and Waisman (1982, 1987).
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In the 1970s and 1980s, a second generation of populism scholarship emerged as
a corrective to these previous structuralist efforts. In an attempt to understand why
supporters followed populist leaders, it took an interpretive approach—exploring the
ways in which populism consists of more than top-down manipulation and, at the
same time, is not simply given by social structure.
One set of scholars attempted to do this by focusing on populist discourse; an-
other, by highlighting the agency of populist followers. Of the two, the discursive
approach has been the most prominent and influential.10 It attempted to answer
a question on which the first generation remained largely silent: What is so com-
pelling about populist discourse to those who support populist politicians? This
approach focused on the production and reception—and most of all the content—of
the personalities, propaganda, and speeches of populist leaders. Not surprisingly, it
received its warmest reception from those sympathetic to the cultural turn. A smaller
group of scholars emphasized the agentic foundations of populist support.11 These
“agentic-interpretive” scholars understood populism not as a class coalition or mode
of discourse, but rather in terms of collective action. Responding in particular to
the proposition that populism was an irrational response to economic change, these
scholars attempted to discover the interests of populist followers and to assess their
limited options for political action. This approach painted a picture of populist
movements as empowered, agentic, rational, and as a force for change—rather than
as irrational and conservative.
Both the discursive and agentic-interpretive approaches were responses—albeit
quite different ones—to the previous structuralist generation’s failure to specify
the steps leading from social conditions to political outcomes. Each had its own
strengths. The discursive approach usefully focused attention on populist ideas, sub-
jectivities, and culture. The agentic-interpretive approach was correct in arguing that
populist participation cannot be explained away as the emotional exuberance of
irrational dopes unmoored from traditional social controls.
While providing useful correctives to the earlier theories, however, neither of these
new approaches provided a sufficient alternative to them. First, neither dealt ade-
quately with the concrete material and organizational considerations necessary for
explaining mobilization to action. The discursive approach assumed that ideas and
subjectivities translate unproblematically into political action. But decades of work
on mobilization have shown this to be an overly simplistic model. Similarly, the
agentic-interpretive approach failed to go far enough in explaining the actions of
populist adherents. It focused on the importance of interests and rational decision
making in producing populist movements. But the social movements literature has
shown that it is also necessary to consider the intervening roles of resources, orga-
nizational capacity, and opportunity (Jenkins 1983:530; Tilly 1978:55). At the same
time, second-generation approaches lacked the conceptual specificity of the first gen-
eration. They subsumed too many cases, often relying only on the lowest common
denominator (an invocation of “the people”) to classify a case as populist.12 In their
10See, for example, Alexander (1973), Allahar (2001), Alvarez Junco (1987), de Ipola (1979), Green
(1996), Hawkins (2009), Hurtado (1989), Laclau (1977, 2005), Leaman (1999), Navarro (1982), Wolfe
(1994), and Zabaleta (1997).
11See, for example, Auyero (1999), Ianni (1973, 1975), Murmis and Portantiero (1971), Spalding (1977),
and Weffort (1998).
12Knight (1998:240) acknowledges—and in fact flaunts—this looseness, seeing it as an asset because
it allows him to be inclusive of the wide and eclectic range of cases that history has agreed to call
“populist.”
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efforts to subsume as many cases as possible, these approaches participated in what
Sartori (1970:1035) has termed “conceptual stretching,” wherein “extensional cover-
age tend[s] to be matched by losses in connotative precision.” The second generation
thus provided a critique of the first, but not a positive alternative.
Finally, in the 1990s, a third generation reoriented the field yet again.13 Focusing
largely on cases of “neopopulism,” this generation has taken a political view of
the phenomenon. It has argued that populism is a symptom of weak democratic
incorporation—that individuals follow populist leaders when they are not firmly
incorporated into political life through strong and stable political parties. This gen-
eration has produced many fresh insights and infused the study of populism with
a new vigor. Its most important contribution has been the decoupling of populist
politics from economic policies. Another contribution has been its insistence on the
central importance of political incorporation.
But despite these advances, political-institutional approaches are inadequate be-
cause they tend to neglect the social factors emphasized by first-generation scholars.
Party instability is not the only route to “political availability” (although it is one
possible route). It is conceivable that parties might be stable, but that characteris-
tics of the population itself might change (e.g., through migration that breaks down
traditional political relationships) or that the state’s infrastructural capacity to in-
corporate different regions might vary over time. Furthermore, established parties
are not themselves incapable of operating on populist premises when it suits their
requirements for political support.
In the end, the existing interdisciplinary literature has not produced an adequate
approach to the problem of populism. Each generation of theory has made important
contributions, but each suffers from significant weaknesses. It is thus necessary to
rethink the problem.
RECONCEPTUALIZING “POPULISM” AS A MODE
OF POLITICAL PRACTICE
Although past approaches to populism have increased our understanding of partic-
ular cases and of populist phenomena in general, it is necessary to consolidate their
innovations while avoiding their weaknesses. This requires producing a clear and
coherent theoretical approach that highlights the specificity of populist phenomena
while suggesting promising directions for future research. The approach presented
here is not meant to trump all others, but rather to identify a coherent set of phe-
nomena that are amenable to comparison and likely to have patterned causes and
consequences (Stinchcombe 1968:40). If it is to maximize the potential for historical
explanation, the central concept needs to be circumscribed at a middle range, be-
tween the tightness of first-generation definitions and the expansiveness of those of
the second.
To do this, I propose a shift away from the problematic notion of “populism” and
toward the concept of populist mobilization. After elaborating this reconceptualiza-
tion, I consider its implications and clarify the limits of the concept by discussing
related phenomena that should be understood as analytically distinct.
13This generation of scholarship includes Castro Rea et al. (1992), Kenney (2004), de la Torre (2000),
Ellner (2003), Huntington (1991), Roberts (1996), and Weyland (1996, 1998, 2000).
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Defining Populist Mobilization
A fundamental problem that cuts across all three generations of the populism liter-
ature is that scholars tend to treat populism as a thing. This sets them searching for
the true essence of populism—whether in the social origins of its leadership, its bases
of support, its ideological content, its policy agenda, or its institutional character.
But this way of thinking never fails to generate intense disagreements about the
fundamental nature of populism. Ill-conceived polemics have raged for decades over
“whether populism is essentially left- or right-wing, fascist or egalitarian, forward-
looking and progressive or backward-looking and nostalgic” (Minogue 1969:200).
One might add to this list: military or civilian, authoritarian or democratic, and
rural or urban.
The best way to move beyond such debates is to shift the focus from the social
content of populism and the ends toward which it is directed to the means by which
it is done.14 This requires investigating populism as a mode of political practice—as a
specific set of actions that politicians and their supporters do—rather than as a type
of movement, party, regime, or ideology. My proposed revision in terminology—
from “populism” to “populist mobilization”—is meant to capture this important
shift from entity to practice.
The first step in such a reconceptualization is to understand populist mobilization
as a political project. I define “political project” as a concerted and sustained set of
political activities—a package of mobilizational and discursive practices—that main-
tains a degree of enduring coherence, both in terms of its rhetorical underpinnings
and its ongoing enactment. By “political activities,” I mean those actions “which are
likely to uphold, to change or overthrow, to hinder or promote” political authority
relations (Weber 1978:55). It is worth noting that, in the modern era, such authority
relations are typically centralized in the organizational apparatus of the territorial
nation-state.15
What, then, makes a political project populist? I define as a project of pop-
ulist mobilization any sustained, large-scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily
marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while
articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people.
“Populist mobilization” thus describes any sustained political project combining
popular mobilization with populist rhetoric. In this sense, it is a compound concept
that requires definitional elaboration across two domains: mobilizational and discur-
sive. The analytical distinction between popular mobilization and populist rhetoric
is important because each can be practiced independently of the other. The term
“populist mobilization” should be reserved for only those political projects in which
the two are copresent and mutually reinforcing.
14The distinction between means and ends (or between form and content) is not new to political
sociology. It is in many ways at the core of Weber’s (1978) political sociology and of Schumpeter’s (1962)
understanding of democracy. The major models of social movement mobilization and influence were
designed to be neutral regarding ends, so as to be applicable to movements from across the ideological
spectrum (e.g., McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly 1978). And the contentious politics literature’s
recent interest in tactical repertoires reinforces this longstanding focus on means (McAdam et al. 2001;
Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1986, 2008; Traugott 1995; Walker et al. 2008). But for much of the populism literature,
means and ends have become thoroughly entangled.
15By this same logic, however, it would also make sense to talk about other scales (local, transnational)
insofar as the apparatus of political control operates at these levels as well. It is also important to note
that, as political authority rests on a foundation of symbolic legitimacy (Bendix 1977:290–97; Loveman
2005), a political project may also be oriented toward bolstering or undercutting the legitimacy of the
state, not just its organizational character.
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Specifying the first half of this equation—popular mobilization—is relatively
straightforward. Political sociology’s understanding of mobilization still follows more
or less in the footsteps of Tilly (1978:69) and his identification of it as “the process
by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active par-
ticipant in public life.” As Oberschall (1973:102) noted, this typically involves some
“process of forming crowds, groups, associations, and organizations for the pursuit
of collective goals.” This basic understanding will suffice for present purposes, with
two caveats. First, it is important not to assume that mobilizing actors constitute a
solidary collectivity, as the formation of such a collectivity is often the result—and
sometimes a primary goal—of mobilization. Second, it is important not to assume
that mobilizing actors share a fixed set of “collective goals,” as the (re)construction
of interests might itself be a product of a mobilization project; and as the interests
of those leading the mobilization might not be identical to those of the mobilized.16
With these caveats in mind, it is reasonable to define political mobilization as the
coordination of the political action of a set of individuals and of the material and
organizational capacity for—and ideational bases of—such action.
Popular mobilization might be thought of as a subtype of political mobiliza-
tion, in that it is the mobilization of ordinarily marginalized social sectors into pub-
licly visible and contentious political action. That is, it is the mobilization of the
poor, the excluded, or others not previously mobilized, into coordinated—and often
confrontational—political activity in public space.17 This might be done through the
staging of marches, rallies, demonstrations, or public meetings that challenge domi-
nant sociopolitical conventions, structures, or actors. The specific content of popular
mobilizing activities in a given time and place is contingent upon a number of con-
textual factors, relating to the existing structures of social relations, the targets of
the mobilization, the patterns of public life, and the existing repertoires for claims
making. The definition elaborated here is meant to allow for such variation in the
specifics of practice, while still identifying a coherent form of mobilization.
Popular mobilization thus defined need not be accompanied by populist rhetoric.
Indeed, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Latin American history contains nu-
merous examples of popular mobilization not motivated or justified by populist
principles.18 To meet the standards of populist mobilization outlined above, popular
mobilization must be infused with a populist rhetoric.
By “populist rhetoric,” I mean an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes
ordinary people. I use the term rhetoric here in its broadest sense, to imply collections
of symbolic actions, styles of expression, public statements (spoken or written),
definitions of the situation, and ways of elaborating ideas that broadly invoke or
reinforce a populist principle, which reciprocally legitimates and animates political
16Recent work in political sociology has warned against taking social groups and their interests as
given (Ansell 2001; Brubaker 2004; Laitin 1985). Recent scholarship on social movements (McAdam
et al. 2001) has been attentive to this concern.
17See Tilly’s (1984:306) definition of “social movement” for a similar emphasis on public visibility and
Gamson’s (1975:16–17) rationale for focusing on previously unmobilized supporters.
18Peru’s electoral campaigns of 1872–1874 provide just one example (Giesecke 1978; Mu¨cke 2001). In
these campaigns, popular sectors were mobilized via clientelistic ties operating through electoral clubs.
Poor and illiterate Peruvians were mobilized into public marches, rallies, and mob actions. But they were
not mobilized as voters—many were not even enfranchised. Rather, these disenfranchised Peruvians were
employed as street troops to seize polling places in public plazas, and generally to manifest visible support.
Their mobilization did not imply a valorization of common people as common people. Rather, it might
be taken as evidence of the vulnerability of their social location.
84 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
action.19 This principle may be expressed more explicitly in some cases than in
others. As Calhoun (1997:3) has noted of nationalism: “The issue is not only whether
participants use a specific term [cf. Greenfeld 1992]. It is, rather, whether participants
use a rhetoric, a way of speaking, a kind of language that carries with it connections
to other events and actions, that enables or disables certain other ways of speaking
or action, or that is recognized by others as entailing certain consequences.”
On one level, populist rhetoric posits the natural social unity and inherent virtu-
ousness of “the people”—of the majority of ordinary members of the national com-
munity. Populist leaders may develop arguments that this “people” includes workers,
the urban poor, the landed and landless peasantry, and indigenous populations, as
well as professionals, the middle class, or even certain segments of the elite. In so
doing, they adopt nationalist ways of speaking and framing situations (sometimes, in
Latin America, alongside tropes of indigenismo or mestizaje). In characterizing such
a broad swath of “popular” society, leaders downplay differences and emphasize
similarities (or at least unity through functional interdependence). In this respect,
populist rhetoric differs from class-based, interest group, or issue-specific rhetoric.
Overall, populist rhetoric represents an attempt to forge a solidary “people” through
its rhetorical invocation.20
At the same time, populist rhetoric sets up its solidary national “people” as
existing in antagonistic vertical relationship to some kind of anti-popular “elite”
(often identified as an economic or political “oligarchy”). Typically, this elite is
portrayed as having disproportionate and unjustified control over conditions affecting
the rights, well-being, and progress of “the people.” Precisely which social groups
get tarred with the elite brush can vary significantly from one case to another.
But regardless of how this parasitic popular enemy is constructed, populist rhetoric
ultimately aims at forging vertically oppositional solidarities at a national level. Such
a Manichean discourse (de la Torre 2000:12–20), emphasizing the immorality of the
elite, is instrumental to the rhetorical project of elevating the moral worth of—and
collapsing competing distinctions within the category of—“the people.”21
The specific content of populist rhetoric varies historically and contextually. Dif-
ferences in social structure, productive relations, and political systems—and in the
salience of those social categories that result—can facilitate quite different populist
rhetorics. At the same time, each country is likely to have its own unique history
of political styles and symbolism, of group representations and narratives, of claims
making and issue framing—all of which contribute to variation in the content of
populist rhetoric. The approach presented here is meant to be flexible enough to
accommodate such contextual variation while still identifying a core principle of
populist legitimation.
19I do not mean an “ideology,” if that term implies an elaborate, coherently structured, and internally
consistent system of ideas. Indeed, one of the first criticisms leveled against populists is typically that
their ideas are ad hoc, contradictory, and imprecise.
20The question of solidarity is of classic sociological concern. In recent decades, scholarship on class
(Fantasia 1988; Przeworski 1977; Thompson 1963), on race and ethnicity (Brubaker 2004; Hobsbawm
1983; Jenkins 1997), and on political cleavages (Laitin 1985) has (re)problematized the concept, questioning
the assumption that solidarity is a natural result of the relations of production, of market position, of
rational decision making, or of primordial biology. Rather, solidarities are made through complex processes
and are contingent events that happen and fluctuate (Brubaker 1996:18–22).
21It is too simplistic to say that populist rhetoric combines a logic of horizontal inclusion with one of
vertical exclusion, since it typically maintains some measure of horizontal exclusion (against “outsider”
ethnic groups, for example) and vertical inclusion (of particular elite segments seen as allied to the cause
of “the people”). But it is safe to say that the vertical, “people-elite” opposition is portrayed as the
primary categorical opposition in a social field otherwise characterized by functional interdependence.
True virtue and authority rest with “the people,” while elites exercise illegitimate authority.
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Just as popular mobilization need not be infused with populist rhetoric, populist
rhetoric is not always instantiated in a mobilization project. Latin American history
provides numerous examples of the elaboration of populist rhetoric in the absence
of active popular mobilization.22 Again, what matters here is the confluence of the
two.
Populist mobilization projects infuse popular mobilization with populist rhetoric.
The populist rhetoric animates, specifies the significance of, and justifies the popular
mobilization; and the popular mobilization instantiates the populist rhetoric in a
popular political project. While the two planes remain analytically distinct, there is
a clear historical correlation. With a sort of elective affinity, each suggests itself to
the other from the perspective of those undertaking political projects, given ade-
quate opportunities for each. For reasons already noted, one populist mobilization
project may look quite different from another pursued in a different time and place.
The conceptualization elaborated here is meant to provide a consistent basis for
identifying what these projects share in common.
Implications
By treating populism as a mode of political practice, the above conceptualization has
several advantages over previous approaches. First, it transcends some of the limita-
tions of first-generation scholarship by abandoning the assumption that populism is
necessarily tied to a particular developmental stage. Populist mobilization does not
reduce to the social content of “populist coalitions,” nor is it linked by necessity to
a particular set of economic conditions or policies. Second, this conceptualization is
less expansive than those of second-generation approaches, providing better analyti-
cal leverage. As noted above, a set of ideas can float about in the ether of political
discourse without ever being instantiated in an actual mobilization project. Third,
it moves beyond the political institutional focus of third-generation scholarship by
understanding populist politics as more than a matter of incorporation.
Furthermore, describing populist mobilization as a political project is significant
for a number of reasons. First, it forces us to specify the actors and organiza-
tions involved. Suggesting that populist politics is about leaders mobilizing supporters
undermines organicist assumptions that populist movements embody some natural
confluence of the interests of—or symbiotic relationships between—prepolitical so-
cial groups.23 Indeed, populist mobilization can be a reasonable strategy for both
incumbents (state leaders) and challengers (leaders of political movements seeking to
gain control of the state). Second, understanding populist mobilization as a project
highlights the spatial limitations of populist politics. States maintain variable degrees
of infrastructural power within their own territories (Mann 1984) and social forma-
tions often vary geographically. For these reasons and others, populist mobilization
is often spatially circumscribed, targeting only certain geographical areas (regions,
provinces, cities, or neighborhoods). Third, understanding populist mobilization as
a project emphasizes its temporal boundedness and variability. Populist mobiliza-
tion is undertaken at specific historical moments, is sustained for limited durations,
22To take just one example, Peru’s Haya de la Torre developed his populist rhetoric through corre-
spondence and public writing over the course of nearly 10 years in exile before engaging in any kind of
sustained, large-scale popular mobilizing.
23While populist leaders often utilize organicist rhetoric (Stepan 1978:3–45; van Niekerk 1974:29), this
does not mean that their movements are organic.
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and is subject to fluctuation in its character and intensity over time. Approaches
to populism based on temporally static (or conventionally periodized) typologies
fail to account for the fact that putatively populist regimes and movements vary
significantly over time in their propensity to enact populist mobilization projects.24
Defining populist mobilization as a project thus identifies a set of practices that are
leader-driven and organizationally maintained, while remaining spatially and tempo-
rally bounded.25
Given the specificity of this conceptualization, it is worth noting a few phenomena
often conflated with populism that it excludes. First, populist mobilization is distinct
from the rise of mass democratic politics—although the two have often occurred
together in history. It is possible to conceive of mass politics developing without
the enactment of populist mobilization.26 And it is possible to conceive of populist
mobilization without mass democratic politics.27
Second, populist mobilization is not identical with the rise of leftist, reformist,
or “popular” movements aimed at helping impoverished social sectors. This applies
to the reformism of the mid-twentieth century—in which many Latin American
countries saw proposals for land reform, pursued nationalist economic policies, and
paid lip service to the importance of social programs—as well as the coming to
power of leftist parties in the last decade of the twentieth century. Shifts to the
left, or to reformism, are important to explain in their own right and should not
be confused with populist mobilization per se—even if reformers sometimes rely on
populist mobilization to build support.
Third and fourth, populist mobilization should not be confused with either tra-
ditional clientelism or with caudillismo. Both modes of political control are deeply
entrenched in the political history of Latin America and so form part of the cul-
tural repertoires of Latin American politicians. But both have also been too easily
conflated with populism. Scholars who see populism as an incorporation project
sometimes confuse it with clientelism. But populist mobilization is not simply a
mode of incorporation; and reducing populist mobilization to clientelism obscures
the fact that it often results from the breakdown of old clientelistic systems. At
the same time, scholars who see populism as a mode of personalistic and charis-
matic politics often take it to be synonymous with caudillismo. But again, populist
mobilization as I have defined it involves much more than charisma—even if it is
undeniable that the modern populist often cloaks himself in the historical mantle
of the virile caudillo. As with mass politics and leftist reformism, clientelism and
caudillismo are important to explain in their own right. While often practiced in
concert with populist mobilization, they should be kept analytically distinct.
The drawing of such careful distinctions is not a frivolous exercise in political label-
ing. Rather, it is a necessary first step toward providing a sound basis for comparative
research. The following section demonstrates this analytical utility by applying the
approach outlined here to mid-twentieth-century Latin American politics.
24For example, Lipset’s (1960:127–79) labeling of Peronism as a “leftist-fascist” regime type inadvertently
gives the impression that Pero´n’s tenure was relatively undifferentiated, when in fact—as will be discussed
later—Pero´n only practiced populist mobilization at specific points in time.
25This carries the important implication that “populist” may not be an appropriate designation for
entire regimes or movements for extended periods of time.
26The most obvious example is the rise of mass politics in Western Europe, where strong labor parties
incorporated and disciplined more potentially radical action (Przeworski 1995:54).
27The massive populist mobilization of workers and urban squatters that Peru’s General Juan Velasco
began in 1968, for example, was conducted through his military government—in a distinctly undemocratic
context (Stepan 1978).
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APPLICATION: THE “CLASSIC” ERA OF LATIN AMERICAN POPULISM
The mid-twentieth-century era of “classic” Latin American populism provides a
unique opportunity to evaluate the new theoretical approach because it has thus
far been the primary referent of most populism scholarship. Recasting populism as
“populist mobilization” clarifies the political terrain of this era, while suggesting
new and promising avenues for future research. It does so in three respects. First,
it brings more analytical precision to the three cases that have been studied most
extensively. Second, it shores up meaningful similarities between these high-profile
cases and others of the same era that have been almost entirely ignored. Third, it
specifies differences between this set of positive cases and a wide range of negative
cases.
High-Profile Cases: Theory Provides Analytical Precision
Populist mobilization played a critical role in the twentieth-century political histories
of most Latin American countries. Indeed, by the definition outlined above, 8 of
the 11 Latin American countries considered here experienced at least one episode
of populist mobilization before 1955: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.28 But just three of these countries have drawn a dispro-
portionate share of the scholarly attention. For these high-profile cases, the concep-
tualization offered here provides greater analytical precision than past approaches.
The existing populism literature on the “classic” period elevates the cases of Ar-
gentina, Brazil, and Mexico.29 In Argentina, the focus has been on President and
General Juan Domingo Pero´n, who mobilized workers into a personalistic party in
support of his own government. In Brazil, President and dictator Getu´lio Vargas—
widely known for his populist rhetoric—has garnered the lion’s share of scholarly
attention. In Mexico, the emphasis has been broadly on the Mexican Revolution
and the postrevolutionary period, in which peasants and workers were mobilized
into a corporatist state party. But Pero´n held the presidency in Argentina from 1946
through 1955, and then again from 1973 to 1974; Vargas was in office from 1930
to 1945 and from 1951 to 1954; and the period treated as populist in the Mexican
case spans roughly 23 years, from 1917 to 1940. Clearly, the analytical instrument
remains blunt.
Reconceptualizing populism as populist mobilization clarifies the spatial and tem-
poral boundaries of these early populist episodes. Measured against the standard
outlined above, it becomes clear that Pero´n began his project of populist mobiliza-
tion in Buenos Aires as early as 1943—even before securing the presidency—and that
this project had wound down by 1949. It becomes apparent that Vargas—although in
office by 1930—did not initiate an active populist mobilization project until 1943 (in
28This discussion excludes Central America, the Caribbean, and the Guianas. For economy of presen-
tation, it is also limited to the first episode of populist mobilization in each country. The article does
not set out to construct a comprehensive catalog of all “classic” populist cases, but only to start the ball
rolling in that direction, while using select cases to demonstrate the utility of the new theoretical approach
to populism that is the focus of this article.
29The first and second generations of populism scholarship were developed largely with reference to
these cases and the overwhelming majority of historical studies have focused on these as well. On the
Argentine case, see Blanksten (1953), Di Tella (1990), Germani (1978), Horowitz (1999), James (1988),
Spektorowski (1994), Tamarin (1982), and van Niekerk (1974:135–77). On the Brazilian case, see Conniff
(1981, 1982a, 1999a), French (1989, 1994), Levine (1970), and Wolfe (1994). On the Mexican case, see
Aguila M. and Enrı´quez Perea (1996), Basurto (1999), Cornelius (1973), Knight (1990, 1994), Stevens
(1977), and vom Hau (2007:165–227).
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anticipation of a postwar democratic opening) and that he sustained this project for
just two years. And in the case of Mexico, a practice-based theory makes it possible
to specify those periods of the Revolution and revolutionary consolidation that were
marked by active populist mobilization (in particular, the 1934–1940 period in which
La´zaro Ca´rdenas led a concerted populist project).
Because regimes and movements can move into and out of populist politics, it is
not adequate to ask simply whether they were or were not populist in some essential
sense. Rather, it is necessary to ask where and when they did and did not actively
pursue populist mobilization. Discussing just one of these cases in more detail should
suffice to illustrate this point.
Pero´n is without a doubt Latin America’s most widely recognized populist, past
or present. But while others have treated “Peronismo” as a unitary (if vague) phe-
nomenon, it is useful to develop a better specification of when and how Pero´n
actually relied most heavily on populist mobilization. I suggest that Pero´n’s first mo-
bilizational period (and Argentina’s first large-scale populist episode) ran from 1943
through 1949—from three years before Pero´n became president through three years
before the close of his first presidential term. In 1943, then-Colonel Pero´n partici-
pated in a coup d’e´tat and was subsequently appointed Secretary of Labor by the new
military government. He initiated his first populist mobilization project at this early
moment, forging ties with unions and mobilizing workers by encouraging strikes, into
which he could then intervene on the side of labor (Skidmore and Smith 1992:88).
This mobilization provoked opposition from other members of the government, who
in 1945 had Pero´n arrested and removed from his post. But by this time, the die was
cast. Pero´n had developed enough support among urban workers that mass demon-
strations forced his release from prison and catapulted him to victory in the 1946
presidential election. Supported by steady economic growth between 1943 and 1948,
Pero´n made efforts to build a multiclass alliance, but workers always formed his
“principal electoral base as well as a massive counterweight against his inconsistent
military, industrial, and middle-class supporters” (Tamarin 1982:40). Argentina’s first
populist episode effectively ended in 1949, when postwar economic crises disrupted
Pero´n’s ability to pursue populist mobilization and led him to rely increasingly on
authoritarian measures for maintaining political control. What matters most in all
of this is not the question of whether Pero´n was or was not himself a populist, but
the fact that he enacted populist mobilization consistently between 1943 and 1949.
Such a periodization does not map onto Pero´n’s presidential tenure and is obscured
by previous approaches to populism, but it captures more precisely the moment of
Argentine history that should be compared with other populist episodes (both high-
and low-profile).
Low-Profile Cases: Theory Identifies Overlooked Similarities
At the same time that the shift from populism to populist mobilization makes it
possible to specify the three most high-profile classic cases with more precision, it
also provides clear criteria for the inclusion of other neglected cases in the compar-
ative matrix. As noted above, five other Latin American countries (of the 11 under
consideration) also experienced at least one episode of populist mobilization in the
classic era. That is, despite the emphases of the existing literature, there have been a
handful of other important moments in which quite similar populist projects made
an early appearance. These overlooked populist episodes may have been shorter-lived
or less consequential than those of Pero´n, Vargas, and Ca´rdenas, but a theory of
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populist mobilization suggests that they share many meaningful similarities with such
high-profile cases. For illustrative purposes, I will provide a brief narrative of just
one of these.
There has been remarkably little scholarship on Bolivian political history. Its revo-
lution of 1952 is probably the least studied in Latin American history and the coun-
try’s first episode of populist mobilization is even less remembered.30 This episode
began early in 1944, after Colonel Gualberto Villarroel came to power in a coup
d’e´tat that was supported by a relatively new political party—the Movimiento Na-
cional Revolucionario (MNR). Facing opposition from the left and the right, as well
as pressure from the United States, Villarroel and the MNR undertook a populist
project to mobilize new bases of support (Gotkowitz 2007:164; Whitehead 1991:530).
The Villarroel-MNR project appealed to mineworkers, urban laborers, informal sec-
tor workers (especially market women), and indigenous peasants. This appeal was
made through a rhetoric that valorized the ideal of a mestizo nation allied against
an “anti-patria” of mining interests, hacienda owners, and others viewed as the do-
mestic allies of foreign imperialists (Gotkowitz 2007:164–91; Whitehead 1991:533).
In the run-up to congressional elections to be held in June 1944, Villarroel and
the MNR initiated an extensive campaign of mobilization and organization, form-
ing a powerful mineworkers’ union, holding a national Indigenous Congress, and
staging importantly symbolic public events and commemorations.31 This first pop-
ulist episode came to an abrupt end on July 20, 1946, when the Frente Democra´tico
Anti-Fascista—an umbrella organization formed to unite the opposition—staged a
violent revolution in which “a street mob burst into the presidential palace, and the
corpse of Villarroel was hung from a lamp post in the Plaza Murillo, in apparent
imitation of the death of Mussolini” (Whitehead 1991:534–35).
Similar stories could be told for each of the other neglected cases. A theory of
populist mobilization would acknowledge, for example, the competitive mobilization
projects of Peru’s Vı´ctor Rau´l Haya de la Torre and Luis M. Sa´nchez Cerro, in the
run-up to the 1931 presidential election, as constituting that country’s first populist
episode. It would recognize the second presidential campaign of Jose´ Marı´a Velasco
Ibarra (1939–1940) as Ecuador’s first populist episode. Ro´mulo Betancourt’s 1945–
1948 mobilization and organization of peasants, farmers, and youth—while attacking
the oligarchy with “extremely aggressive” speeches (Ellner 1999:129)—would enter
into comparative discussions as Venezuela’s first populist episode. And due attention
would be paid to Jorge Elie´cer Gaita´n’s mobilization projects of 1944 through 1948
as representing Colombia’s first populist episode. While each of these has been the
subject of at least a few historical studies, they have almost never been incorporated
into theoretical or comparative discussions of populist politics.32 The continuation
of such neglect threatens to impede our understanding of Latin American populism
because all five cases share important practical similarities with the high-profile
cases.
30On the Bolivian case, see Gotkowitz (2007) and Whitehead (1991).
31For a detailed analysis of the Indigenous Congress, see Gotkowitz (2007:192–232). On Villarroel’s
massive effort at commemorating the heroic actions of mestiza market women in Bolivia’s war for inde-
pendence, see Gotkowitz (2000).
32On the Peruvian case, see Klare´n (1973) and Stein (1980). On the Ecuadoran case, see Arı´zaga Vega
(1985), Ca´rdenas Reyes (1991), de la Torre (1993, 2000:28–79), Maiguashca and North (1991), and Sosa-
Buchholz (1999). On the Venezuelan case, see Davila (2000) and Ellner (1982, 1999). On the Colombian
case, see Braun (1985), Dix (1978), and Green (1996).
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Negative Cases: Theory Specifies Previously Unappreciated Differences
Too often, popular views of Latin American politics suffer from the impression that
populism is endemic in the region—that it is simply part of the political culture.
But populist mobilization has only been pursued at specific times and in particular
places. Thus, at the same time that reconceptualizing populism as populist mobi-
lization brings greater analytical precision to the high-profile cases and incorporates
various neglected cases into the comparative fold, it usefully delimits the universe
of cases. It makes it possible to specify what populist mobilization is not, excluding
cases too casually lumped together under the pejorative folk label “populist.” This
identification of meaningful difference is just as important as the discovery of unap-
preciated similarity for clarifying the political terrain and establishing new lines of
research.
Populist mobilization has not been a constant feature of Latin American political
history, but rather is an innovation of the twentieth century. Before this point, Latin
American politics was defined by the looming presence of the military in political
life, by conflicts between caudillo strongmen competing for the spoils of office, by
liberal-conservative, rural-urban, and regional rivalries, and—with the rise of electoral
politics and political parties—by various, often corrupt, forms of elite control over
electoral outcomes. But it is only when we conflate populism with authoritarianism,
caudillismo, clientelism, corruption—or, somewhat differently, with any anti-status-
quo movement—that the phenomenon seems to reach deep back into the nineteenth
century. Providing the means to avoid such conflation is one of the advantages of
the present theory.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, new social and political conditions
began to provide creative politicians with glimpses of novel opportunities for securing
and maintaining power. Around this time, some countries experienced short-lived
episodes of what might be thought of as “proto-populist” mobilization. But it was
not until Peru’s 1931 election that the region experienced its first sustained, large-
scale populist episode. While it is important to understand the ways in which populist
mobilization was foreshadowed by more limited mobilization projects before 1931, a
practice-oriented theory provides clear standards for excluding such previous political
activities.
But even after 1931, populist mobilization was far from endemic in Latin America.
While by the definition proposed here most Latin American countries had experi-
enced a populist episode by 1955, nonpopulist phases still significantly outnumbered
examples of concerted populist mobilization—even in those countries. More interest-
ing still, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay experienced no episodes of populist mobi-
lization in the classic era. Remarkably, the populism literature has paid almost no
attention to these anomalous cases—likely because it lacks the criteria for identifying
them as such. But any theory claiming to explain populist mobilization must also
be able to account for negative cases. A practice-based approach thus circumscribes
the phenomenon in a way that is both intellectually provocative and theoretically
necessary.
CONCLUSIONS
Sociology has long been insulated from populism studies. By now it should be evident
that the fragmented and theoretically impoverished populism literature has much to
gain by drawing on recent innovations in political sociology. But sociology similarly
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stands to benefit by taking populist cases seriously. The recent return to populist
politics in Latin America and elsewhere serves as a reminder that populism is not a
relic of an earlier developmental stage, but rather an important and enduring feature
of the modern civic and political landscape. For sociology, this presents a serious
challenge—but also a tremendous opportunity for theoretical development and for
increased social and political relevance.
This article has engaged with Latin America’s classic populist era to demonstrate
the analytical utility of its practice-based approach, but the approach is meant to
be equally applicable to contemporary Latin American politics. The fact that the
neopopulists of the 1990s largely pursued neoliberal policies, while others have lately
been more progressive, ceases to be problematic when populism is viewed as a flexible
practice. Similarly, that not all politicians who might be thought of as representing
Latin America’s broader turn to the left have pursued populist mobilization is also
easily understood when means are differentiated from ends. The theory outlined here
facilitates such distinctions and makes it possible to move forward with a clearer
sense of the political reality. While this article has remained agnostic regarding the
applicability of its framework beyond Latin America, it provides a baseline for the
design of rigorous comparative studies aimed at addressing this important question.
But whether focused on Latin America or other regions—and whether endeavoring
to explain politics in the past or present—reconceptualizing populism as populist
mobilization emancipates scholars from old stalemates and motivates new research
questions. Such questions include: (1) When, where, and why have politicians come
to pursue populist mobilization as a political strategy? That is, what conditions have
encouraged and shaped the emergence of this repertoire of political practices? (2)
What do populist mobilization projects look like in their practical details and how are
the dynamics of populist mobilizing different from or similar to those of other modes
of political activity? (3) Under what conditions does populist mobilization succeed
in securing the degree, type, and duration of political support that its practitioners
mean to achieve? (4) What are the consequences (both intended and unintended) of
the practice of populist mobilization for other domains of social and political life?
Systematic and rigorous attempts to answer such questions would facilitate a long
awaited coming to terms with the problem of populism.
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